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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
College Savings Bank ("CSB") and the United States 
appeal from a final judgment entered in the district court 
on December 16, 1996, dismissing an unfair competition 
claim CSB brought against Florida Prepaid Postsecondary 
Education Expense Board ("Florida Prepaid") under the 
Lanham Act. See 15 U.S.C. S 1051 et seq. They assert that 
the district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
SS 1331 and 1338(a). We have jurisdiction to review the 
judgment of the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
S 1291, and we exercise plenary review. See Alston v. 
Redman, 34 F.3d 1237, 1242 (3d Cir. 1994). 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
CSB is a New Jersey chartered, FDIC-member bank. 
Since 1987, it has been selling CollegeSure(R) CDs which 
are deposit contracts designed to provide sufficient funds to 
cover future costs of college education. CSB administers 
these deposit contracts in accordance with a patented 
methodology. See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 948 F. Supp. 400, 401 
n.1 (D.N.J. 1996). The State of Florida created the appellee 
Florida Prepaid to market and sell tuition prepayment 
programs designed to provide sufficient funds to cover 
future college expenses. See Fla. Stat. ch. 240.551 (1997). 
In conjunction with the sale of its accounts, Florida Prepaid 
publishes brochures and issues annual reports. Thus, CSB 
and Florida Prepaid compete in selling this type of college 
savings account. 
 
CSB first brought an action in the district court against 
Florida Prepaid on November 7, 1994, alleging that Florida 
Prepaid had infringed its patent. CSB subsequently brought 
another action in the same court on August 25, 1995, 
against Florida Prepaid alleging that it had violated section 
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43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a). 1 CSB claimed 
in the second action that Florida Prepaid made 
misstatements about Florida Prepaid's tuition savings plans 
in its brochures and annual reports which constituted 
unfair competition. We deal only with the second action 
and thus our further references are to that case. 
 
Florida Prepaid answered the complaint and filed a 
counterclaim on November 8, 1995, alleging defamation, 
product disparagement, and trade libel based on 
statements made by Peter Roberts, president of CSB. CSB 
moved to dismiss the counterclaim on February 9, 1996, 
and the district court granted that motion on March 22, 
1996. 
 
Florida Prepaid filed motions to dismiss CSB's complaint 
on April 26, 1996, alleging that the recent Supreme Court 
decision of Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. 1114 
(1996), which confined Congress' authority to abrogate a 
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity from a suit in a 
federal court to the enforcement section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, deprived the district court of jurisdiction. 
Florida Prepaid claimed that: (1) in the light of Seminole 
Tribe, the Trademark Remedy Clarification Act of 1992, 
Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992) ("TRCA"), which 
abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under 
the Lanham Act, was unconstitutional, because the 
abrogation was not a proper exercise of Congress' 
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers; and (2) 
Seminole Tribe implicitly overruled the Parden doctrine, 
which allows for the constructive waiver of Eleventh 
Amendment immunity by a state engaging in an activity 
after Congress subjected it to suit arising from the activity. 
See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 
U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207 (1964). The United States 
intervened on August 2, 1996, to defend the 
constitutionality of the Lanham Act's application to the 
states and thus does not take a position on CSB's other 
arguments. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. It also pleaded a common law tort of unfair competition but we will 
not discuss that claim further as the district court dismissed it, and the 
claim obviously could not be asserted successfully in the light of the 
Eleventh Amendment. 
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With regard to the Lanham Act claim, the district court 
found that, after Seminole Tribe, the TRCA, as applied to 
the present case, was an unconstitutional attempt to 
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. The 
court concluded that inasmuch as this case does not 
involve a protected property interest, the enactment of the 
TRCA could not be a proper exercise of Congress' powers 
under section five, the enforcement section, of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See College Sav. Bank, 948 F. 
Supp. at 426-27. The district court further held on two 
separate grounds that the Parden doctrine of constructive 
waiver did not permit CSB to sue Florida Prepaid in federal 
court. First, the district court found that the constructive 
waiver doctrine did not apply because Florida Prepaid was 
engaging in a core government function. See id. at 418. 
Second, the district court determined that the Supreme 
Court's decision in Seminole Tribe implicitly overruled the 
Parden doctrine of constructive waiver. See id. at 420. 
Therefore, on either of these grounds, the district court held 
that Parden did not permit CSB's suit against Florida 
Prepaid in federal court. Finally, the district court rejected 
CSB's contention that Florida Prepaid had waived its 
immunity through its appearance in the litigation. See id. 
at 414. Thus, the district court granted Florida Prepaid's 
motion to dismiss the Lanham Act claim on December 13, 
1996. 
 
CSB appealed from the dismissal of the Lanham Act 
claim to this court.2 We will affirm the district court's 
holding that the TRCA is an unconstitutional exercise of 
Congress' Fourteenth Amendment powers as applied to the 
present case, but we express no opinion on whether 
Seminole overruled Parden, because we hold that even if the 
Parden waiver doctrine is still viable, it does not apply to 
Florida Prepaid. Finally, we hold that Florida Prepaid did 
not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity through its 
appearance in this litigation. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. The district court denied Florida Prepaid's motion to dismiss the 
Patent Act claim in the same order of December 13, 1996, and 
subsequently Florida Prepaid appealed from the denial to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. The Eleventh Amendment 
 
The Eleventh Amendment provides: 
 
       The Judicial power of the United States shall not be 
       construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, 
       commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
       States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or 
       Subjects of any Foreign State. 
 
The Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment to 
prevent suits against unconsenting states in federal court. 
See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 116 S.Ct. at 1122. 
Because Florida Prepaid is an arm of the State of Florida, 
see College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 413, the Eleventh 
Amendment is a potential bar to CSB's suit against Florida 
Prepaid. However, this protection available to states under 
the Eleventh Amendment can be circumvented if Congress 
properly abrogates the immunity, see Seminole Tribe, 116 
S.Ct. at 1123, or if a state waives its immunity and 
consents to suit in federal court. See Welch v. Texas Dep't 
of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 473-74, 107 
S.Ct. 2941, 2946 (1987). CSB contends that there has been 
both abrogation and waiver in this case. We will consider 
each of these arguments in turn. 
 
B. The TRCA's Abrogation of 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
 
One of the main purposes of section 43 of the Lanham 
Act is to protect persons engaged in interstate commerce 
against unfair competition caused by false or misleading 
representations or advertising about goods, services, or 
commercial activities. See 15 U.S.C. S 1125(a)(1). Congress 
amended the Act in 1992 when it enacted the TRCA to 
clarify its intent to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment 
immunity of states in actions under the Lanham Act. See 
15 U.S.C. S 1125(a). Congress passed the TRCA in response 
to Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246, 
105 S.Ct. 3142, 3149 (1985), which required Congress to 
give an explicit and unambiguous statement in a statute to 
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manifest an intent to abrogate the states' immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment. See S. Rep. No. 102-280, at 4-7 
(1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3090-93. By 
enacting the TRCA, Congress intended to place states on an 
equal footing with commercial competitors. See id. at 3093, 
3095. Inasmuch as Florida Prepaid is an arm of the State 
of Florida, the TRCA by its terms, if valid, would abrogate 
Florida Prepaid's Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 
College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 413. However, Florida 
Prepaid argues that the Seminole Tribe decision limiting the 
scope of Congress' powers to abrogate a state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity renders the TRCA unconstitutional 
as applied in this case. We agree with this contention. 
 
1. The Seminole Tribe Decision 
 
In Seminole Tribe, the Court set forth a clear two-part 
standard of how Congress could abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment immunity of states. See id. at 1123. The Court 
said that to find if there has been an abrogation a court 
must answer two questions affirmatively: "first, whether 
Congress has `unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to 
abrogate the immunity,' and second, whether Congress has 
acted `pursuant to a valid exercise of power.' " Id. (citations 
omitted). 
 
a. Legislative Intent 
 
Under the first question posed by Seminole Tribe, 
Congress must evidence an intent to abrogate the states' 
immunity from suit in federal court through a "clear 
legislative statement." Id. (quoting Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786, 111 S.Ct. 2578, 2584 
(1991)). The TRCA surely manifests that intent. Section 
1122, entitled "Liability of States, instrumentalities of 
States and State officials" provides: 
 
       (a) Any State, instrumentality of a State or any officer 
       or employee of a State or instrumentality of a State 
       acting in his or her official capacity, shall not be 
       immune, under the eleventh amendment of the 
       Constitution of the United States or under any other 
       doctrine of sovereign immunity, from suit in Federal 
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       court by any person, including any governmental or 
       nongovernmental entity for any violation under this 
       chapter. 
 
       (b) In a suit described in subsection (a) of this section 
       for a violation described in that subsection, remedies 
       (including remedies both at law and in equity) are 
       available for the violation to the same extent as such 
       remedies are available for such a violation in a suit 
       against any person other than a State, instrumentality 
       of a State, or officer or employee of a State or 
       instrumentality of a State acting in his or her official 
       capacity. . . . 
 
15 U.S.C. S 1122. This language manifests Congress' 
unambiguous intent to abrogate the states' immunity. 
Therefore, the TRCA meets the first requirement of Seminole 
Tribe to find that Congress has abrogated the states' 
immunity. 
 
b. Valid Exercise of Power 
 
The second prong of Seminole Tribe requires that 
Congress act pursuant to a valid exercise of power. Prior to 
Seminole Tribe, the Supreme Court had determined that 
there were only two constitutional bases for Congress 
validly to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity. First, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 96 
S.Ct. 2666 (1976), the Court found that Congress could act 
pursuant to section five of the Fourteenth Amendment to 
abrogate states' immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. 
The Court reasoned that Congress had this power because 
the Fourteenth Amendment "had fundamentally altered the 
balance of state and federal power struck by the 
Constitution." Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1125. 
 
Second, in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 
109 S.Ct. 2273 (1989), "a plurality of the Court found that 
the Interstate Commerce Clause, Art. I, S 8, cl. 3, granted 
Congress the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity." 
Seminole Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1125. In Seminole Tribe, the 
Court was asked to find a third basis of authority for 
Congress to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment 
immunity -- the Indian Commerce Clause. See U.S. Const. 
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Art. 1, S 8, cl. 3. The Court held that the Indian Commerce 
Clause did not provide a basis for Congress to exercise that 
power. In fact, the Court overruled Union Gas by 
determining that the Commerce Clause itself did not 
provide a basis for Congress to abrogate the states' 
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole 
Tribe, 116 S.Ct. at 1128. Thus, since Seminole Tribe section 
five of the Fourteenth Amendment has been the sole basis 
for Congress to abrogate the states' immunity under the 
Eleventh Amendment. Accordingly, to meet the second 
prong of the Seminole Tribe test, the TRCA must have been 
enacted pursuant to this power. 
 
2. The Fourteenth Amendment and the TRCA 
 The legislative history of the TRCA does not delineate 
conclusively the constitutional basis for its enactment. The 
only mention of Fourteenth Amendment authority is found 
in a brief notation in a Senate Report. See S. Rep. No. 102- 
280, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3087, 3094 
(stating that the TRCA "is justified under the Commerce 
Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment."). Yet this failure 
to explain fully the constitutional justification for its 
enactment does not invalidate the TRCA, for Congress is 
not required to discuss or explain explicitly the 
constitutional basis for laws that it enacts. See, e.g., FCC v. 
Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315, 113 S.Ct. 
2096, 2102 (1993) (holding that a legislature is"never 
require[d] . . . to articulate its reasons for enacting a 
statute"); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243-44 n.18, 
103 S.Ct. 1054, 1064 n.18 (1983).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Court in EEOC v. Wyoming stated: 
 
       It is in the nature of our review of congressional legislation 
defended 
       on the basis of Congress' powers under S 5 of the Fourteenth 
       Amendment that we be able to discern some legislative purpose or 
       factual predicate that supports the exercise of that power. That 
does 
       not mean, however, that Congress need anywhere recite the words 
       `section 5' or `Fourteenth Amendment' or `equal protection' for 
`[t]he 
       . . . constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend 
       on recitals of the power which it undertakes to exercise.' 
 
460 U.S. at 243-44 n.18, 103 S.Ct. at 1064 n.18 (citations omitted) 
(quoting Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 144, 68 S.Ct. 421, 
424 (1948)). 
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Furthermore, as the Court recently has stated, 
congressional enactments are accorded a "presumption of 
validity," because "[i]t is for Congress in the first instance to 
`determin[e] whether and what legislation is needed to 
secure the guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment,' and 
its conclusions are entitled to much deference." City of 
Boerne v. Flores, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2172 (1997) (quoting 
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651, 86 S.Ct. 1717, 
1723-24 (1966)). However, "Congress' discretion is not 
unlimited" and courts must ensure that congressional acts 
do not overstep the boundaries of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Id. at 2172. Therefore, while the brief 
statement of the constitutional foundation for the TRCA in 
the Senate Report is entitled to deference, it does not 
establish that the TRCA is constitutional. Consequently, we 
are obliged to examine the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and determine whether the TRCA is valid 
under the amendment's enforcement section. 
 
The Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment 
provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. 
CONST. amend. 14, S 1. Sectionfive of the Fourteenth 
Amendment gives Congress the power "to enforce, by 
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. 
CONST. amend. 14, S 5. The Court long has recognized that 
Congress' power to legislate under section five is quite 
broad: 
 
       Whatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to 
       carry out the objects the amendments have in view, 
       whatever tends to enforce submission to the 
       prohibitions they contain, and to secure to all persons 
       the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the 
       equal protection of the laws against State denial or 
       invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the 
       domain of congressional power. 
 
Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879). However, 
Congress' power under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not without boundaries. As the Court held 
in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 91 S.Ct. 260 (1970): 
 
       As broad as the congressional enforcement power is, it 
       is not unlimited. Specifically, there are at least three 
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       limitations upon Congress' power to enforce the 
       guarantees of the Civil War Amendments. First, 
       Congress may not by legislation repeal other provisions 
       of the Constitution. Second, the power granted to 
       Congress was not intended to strip the States of their 
       power to govern themselves . . . . Third, Congress may 
       only `enforce' the provisions of the amendments and 
       may only do so by `appropriate legislation.' 
 
400 U.S. at 128-29, 91 S.Ct. at 266-67. The Court also 
recently has cautioned that "Congress does not enforce a 
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has 
been given the power `to enforce,' not the power to 
determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." City 
of Boerne, 117 S.Ct. at 2164. Therefore, while Congress has 
broad remedial power under the Fourteenth Amendment, it 
does not have a basis for enacting substantive, non- 
remedial measures. 
 
Because of this limitation, for a law to be a valid 
mechanism to enforce the Due Process Clause, it must not 
create new substantive rights, but instead must provide a 
method of protecting against violations of those rights 
already extant. The Due Process Clause itself sets out the 
boundaries of what rights it protects: the conduct must 
involve action by a state; it must deprive an individual of 
life, liberty or property; and the deprivation must occur 
without due process of law. These three requirements are at 
the core of what the TRCA must remedy to be valid under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
However, for the TRCA to be a valid enforcement of the 
Due Process Clause under section five, it does not need to 
protect only against constitutional violations. Rather, the 
TRCA can serve the broader purposes of the Due Process 
Clause. The Court in City of Boerne, reiterated this notion: 
"Legislation [enacted under section five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment] which deters or remedies constitutional 
violations can fall within the sweep of Congress' 
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits 
conduct which is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes 
into `legislative spheres of autonomy previously reserved to 
the States.' " Id. at 2163 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U.S. at 455, 96 S.Ct. at 2671). Yet even though the 
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violations against which it protects do not have to rise to 
the level of constitutional violations, the TRCA must further 
the goals of protecting property from state action 
undertaken without due process of law, because the 
congressional enforcement power under the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not unlimited. See City of Boerne, 117 S.Ct. 
at 2163. 
 
In deciding that the TRCA is not valid as applied in this 
case under the Fourteenth Amendment, the district court 
concluded that the case did not involve a property right; 
therefore, the TRCA did not further the purposes of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See College Sav. Bank, 948 F. 
Supp. at 426-28. The district court first determined that 
the false advertising prong of the Lanham Act invoked by 
CSB "essentially protects the `right to be free from false 
advertising.' " Id. at 426. This right, according to the district 
court, was not property for purposes of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; in fact, the district court could notfind any 
precedent "even discussing whether the right to be free of 
unfair competition is `property.' " Id. at 426-27 n.27. The 
district court indicated that "we are unaware of any 
authority suggesting that Congress may, by simplefiat, 
abruptly declare that a simple statutory cause of action, 
which traditionally has not been understood to involve any 
kind of property, now encompasses a `property right' to 
which the Fourteenth Amendment applies." Id. at 427. 
Therefore, according to the district court, because a 
property right was not involved, Congress did not have the 
power under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact the TRCA 
as it applied to this case. 
 
In our examination of the TRCA, we, too, focus on the 
question of whether the TRCA protects a property right 
recognized under the Fourteenth Amendment. The tort of 
unfair competition created by the Lanham Act protects 
against certain harms involving improper interference with 
business prospects. See 15 U.S.C. S 1127; see also AT & T 
Co. v. Winback and Conserve Program, Inc., 42 F.2d 1421, 
1428 (3d Cir. 1994) (noting that the Lanham Act contains 
language that " `creates a federal cause of action for unfair 
competition.' ") (citations omitted). CSB contends that this 
tort of unfair competition protects intangible property 
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rights; therefore, the TRCA should be seen to protect 
property as defined under the Fourteenth Amendment. The 
tort of unfair competition found in the Lanham Act does 
protect some intangible property rights, but no such 
intangible property is involved in the present case. See W. 
Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts 
S 130, at 1015 (5th ed. 1984) (citing trade marks, 
copyrights, and patents as intangible property rights that 
the tort of unfair competition involves). Instead, CSB's 
Lanham Act claim concerns allegedly false statements 
about a competitor's own product. The only cognizable 
property right that could be involved would be a right to be 
free of false advertising, a right that is not an intangible 
property right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects some categories of intangible property 
rights. See, e.g., Tulsa Prof 'l Collection Serv. v. Pope, 485 
U.S. 478, 485, 108 S.Ct. 1340, 1345 (1988) (in recognizing 
an unsecured claim against the estate, the Court wrote: 
"Little doubt remains that such an intangible interest is 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."); Logan v. 
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 430, 102 S.Ct. 1148, 
1155 (1982) ("[T]he types of interests protected as `property' 
are varied and, as often as not, intangible, relating `to the 
whole domain of social and economic fact.' ") (citations 
omitted); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 710, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 
1165 (1976) ("[T]here exists a variety of interests which are 
difficult of definition but are nevertheless comprehended 
within the meaning of either `liberty' or `property' as meant 
in the Due Process Clause."). However, not all intangible 
rights have been deemed to be property under the 
Fourteenth Amendment, see Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 712, 
96 S.Ct. at 1166 (holding that a person's reputation was 
not intangible property covered by Fourteenth Amendment), 
and the right to be free from unfair advertising is not one 
of the protected property interests. While infringement on 
such a right might give rise to a cause of action, the right 
does not amount to "property" within the meaning of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. CSB asserts that the Supreme Court recognized that the tort of unfair 
competition involved protected intangible property rights in International 
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We also reject CSB's contention that the TRCA 
necessarily involves a protected property right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment on the basis that it attempts to 
protect businesses from harm. Clearly, a business is an 
established property right entitled to protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Duplex Printing Press Co. 
v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 465, 41 S.Ct. 172, 176 (1920) 
(finding that a "business . . . is a property right, entitled to 
protection against unlawful injury or interference .. ."); 
United States v. Tropiano, 418 F.2d 1069, 1076 (2d Cir. 
1969) ("The right to pursue a lawful business including the 
solicitation of customers necessary to the conduct of such 
business has long been recognized as a property right 
within the protection of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the Constitution.") (citations omitted); 
Small v. United States, 333 F.2d 702, 704 (3d Cir. 1964) 
("The right to pursue a lawful business or occupation is a 
right of property which the law protects against intentional 
and unjustifiable interference. A cause of action based 
upon such an interference is analogous to one based upon 
unlawful interference with existing contracts, and is 
governed by the same principles.") (citations omitted). 
Nevertheless, while a business is a property right, the fact 
that CSB operates a business does not lead necessarily to 
the conclusion that the TRCA as applied in this case 
protects property rights. 
 
For instance, in Gentry v. Howard, 365 F. Supp. 567 
(W.D. La. 1973), an operator of an ambulance service sued 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 236, 39 S.Ct. 68, 71 
(1918) ("[T]he right to acquire property by honest labor or the conduct of 
a lawful business is as much entitled to protection as the right to guard 
property already acquired. . . . It is this right that furnishes the basis 
of 
the jurisdiction in the ordinary case of unfair competition.") (citations 
omitted). However, the quoted language concerned the question of 
whether the courts should exercise equity jurisdiction over the dispute; 
the Court needed to determine if a right sufficient to sustain such 
jurisdiction had been violated and if a harm had occurred. Thus, while 
the opinion does discuss property rights and the tort of unfair 
competition, the Court did not determine whether the tortious actions 
injured a property right worthy of protection under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. The Court merely determined that an injury to a specific 
right had occurred. 
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the mayor of the City of Monroe in part on due process 
grounds, because the city began operating a competing 
ambulance service. The district court held that this action 
by the city did not amount to a due process violation, 
because no deprivation of property had occurred, within the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though the 
city clearly was competing with the private business which 
suffered from this competition, this harm did not rise to the 
level of a deprivation of property under the Fourteenth 
Amendment. See also Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 
293 U.S. 163, 170, 55 S.Ct. 7, 9 (1934) ("The Fourteenth 
Amendment does not protect a business against the 
hazards of competition."); cf. Reich v. Beharry, 883 F.2d 
239, 242 (3d Cir. 1989) ("Every breach of contract by 
someone acting under color of state law [does not] 
constitute[ ] a deprivation of property for procedural due 
process purposes."). As Gentry illustrates, just because the 
state's actions impact on a private business does not mean 
that this action somehow infringes on the Fourteenth 
Amendment rights of the private individual. 
 
If a state's conduct impacting on a business always 
implicated the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress would 
have almost unrestricted power to subject states to suit 
through the exercise of its abrogation power. Congress 
could pass any law that tangentially affected the ability of 
businesses to operate and then create causes of action 
against the states in federal court if they infringed on those 
federally created rights. This result would be unacceptable 
and would conflict directly with the strict limits on 
Congress' powers to abrogate a state's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Thus, because this case does not 
involve a property interest protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the TRCA, as applied in this case, is an 
unconstitutional exercise of Congress' powers. 
 
We carefully have confined our discussion by holding 
that the TRCA is unconstitutional as applied "in this case." 
We have done so for two reasons. First, as the district court 
correctly noted, the false advertising prong of the Lanham 
Act implicated in this litigation is "separate and distinct 
from the trademark infringement prong." College Sav. Bank, 
948 F. Supp. at 426 n.25. Second, the false advertising 
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prong of the Lanham Act not only proscribes 
misrepresentations regarding a person's own goods or 
services, but it also forbids misrepresentations about a 
competitor's goods or services. 11 U.S.C. S 1125 (a)(1)(B). 
Since the present case only involves allegations that Florida 
Prepaid misrepresented its own product, the second part of 
the false advertising prong is not implicated. Therefore, 
because the scope of the allegations in this case is so 
narrow, we express no opinion as to whether the TCRA may 
be applied constitutionally in a case involving a trademark 
infringement or involving a misrepresentation about a 
competitor's goods or services. 
 
C. Constructive Waiver of 
Eleventh Amendment Immunity 
 
CSB also contends that Florida Prepaid has 
constructively waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity on 
two different grounds: the Parden doctrine and the conduct 
of Florida Prepaid in this litigation. We reject each of these 
arguments. 
 
1. The Parden Doctrine 
 
The high point of Supreme Court jurisprudence of the 
doctrine of constructive consent was Parden v. Terminal Ry. 
of Ala. State Docks Dep't, 377 U.S. 184, 84 S.Ct. 1207. See 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction 408 (2d ed. 1994). 
In Parden, railroad workers sued a railroad, wholly owned 
and operated by the State of Alabama, to recover damages 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"). See 
377 U.S. at 184-85, 84 S.Ct. at 1209. Alabama defended 
the suit on the basis of the Eleventh Amendment. The 
Court focused on two questions: whether Congress 
intended the FELA to apply to the states, and whether it 
had the power to do so. First, by its language, the FELA 
applied to "every" common carrier. Id. at 187, 84 S.Ct. at 
1210. The Court held that because Congress did not 
distinguish between state and privately operated common 
carriers, Congress must have intended the Act to apply to 
state operated common carriers. Turning to the second 
question, the Court held that the constitutional basis for 
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the enactment of FELA was the Interstate Commerce 
Clause. See id. at 190-91, 84 S.Ct. at 1211-12. The Court 
then reasoned that because "the States surrendered a 
portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the 
power to regulate commerce," the clause could be used as 
a basis to waive a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
Id. at 191, 84 S.Ct. at 1212. Because Alabama voluntarily 
had operated the railroad after the enactment of FELA, the 
Court held that the state had consented to the suit in 
federal court under the Act. See id. at 192, 84 S.Ct. at 
1213. Therefore, Alabama was deemed to have waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity in Parden. 
 
In the years following Parden, the Court has modified and 
partially overruled it. The first significant modification 
occurred in Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare 
v. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 93 S.Ct. 
1614 (1973). That case involved a suit by state hospital and 
training school employees for overtime compensation under 
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"). See id. at 280-81, 
93 S.Ct. at 1616. The State of Missouri defended the suit 
on Eleventh Amendment grounds, and the Court applied 
the same two-part test found in Parden. First, it found that 
Congress clearly intended to bring employees of "hospitals 
and related institutions" under the Act. Id. at 283, 93 S.Ct. 
at 1617. Second, the Court recognized that the basis for the 
enactment of the FLSA was the Interstate Commerce 
Clause. See id. at 282, 93 S.Ct. at 1617. However, the 
Court distinguished Parden from Employees. The Court 
explained that the State of Alabama in Parden was involved 
in an "area where private persons and corporations 
normally ran the enterprise." Id. at 284, 93 S.Ct. at 1617. 
In Employees the institutions were state hospitals and 
training schools which were not operated for profit, and 
instead were of an integral state concern. See id. Because 
of their importance to the state government, the Court 
found that Congress could not abrogate Missouri's Eleventh 
Amendment immunity under the FLSA in that case. In 
Employees, therefore, the Court created the important 
government function exception to Parden. Under this 
exception, a state cannot be deemed to have waived its 
immunity if it is engaged in an important or core 
government function. 
 
                                18 
 
 
 
The Court restricted the scope of Parden further in 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347 (1974). In 
challenging Illinois' administration of the Aid to the Aged, 
Blind, and Disabled ("AABD") welfare program, the plaintiffs 
in that class action asserted that officials from the State of 
Illinois had waived the state's Eleventh Amendment 
immunity in welfare suits by participating in and receiving 
funds from the federal welfare program. Stressing that 
"[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly 
associated with the surrender of constitutional rights," the 
Court held that "[t]he mere fact that a State participates in 
a program through which the Federal Government provides 
assistance for the operation by the State of a system of 
public aid is not sufficient to establish consent on the part 
of the State to be sued in the federal courts." Id. at 673, 94 
S.Ct. at 1360-61. Thus, the Court rejected the waiver 
argument in that case. 
 
In 1987, the Court again pared back Parden in Welch v. 
Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 
107 S.Ct. 2941. In Welch, an employee of the Texas 
Department of Highways and Public Transportationfiled 
suit under the Jones Act against the state and the 
department to recover damages for injuries she incurred 
while working on a ferry dock. See id. at 470-71, 107 S.Ct. 
at 2944. The Jones Act remedies were available to"[a]ny 
seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of 
his employment." The employee argued that the State of 
Texas was an employer within this section. Id. at 475, 107 
S.Ct. at 2947. In considering whether Congress intended to 
apply the Act to the states, the Court found that the line of 
cases it had decided since Parden "required an unequivocal 
expression that Congress intended to override Eleventh 
Amendment immunity. Accordingly, to the extent that 
Parden v. Terminal Railway, . . . is inconsistent with the 
requirement that an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity by Congress must be expressed in unmistakably 
clear language, it is overruled." Id. at 478, 107 S.Ct. at 
2948 (citations omitted). Thus, the Court changed the first 
prong of the Parden test to require a clear statement of 
congressional intent. Because it found no such intent in 
the Jones Act, the Court declined to hold that Texas had 
waived its immunity. 
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Therefore, the Parden doctrine holds that a state's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity can be constructively 
waived if: (1) Congress enacts a law providing that a state 
will be deemed to have waived its Eleventh Amendment 
immunity if it engages in the activity covered by the federal 
legislation; (2) the law does so through a clear statement 
that gives notice to the states; (3) a state then engages in 
that activity covered by the federal legislation; and (4) the 
activity in question is not an important or core government 
function. 
 
In the present case, at least assuming that CSB can 
establish the elements of its case, the first three 
requirements of the Parden doctrine clearly have been or 
will be met. Although the TRCA does not mention 
specifically prepaid tuition programs, the Act declares that 
if a state or its instrumentality chooses to engage in a 
proprietary activity that potentially falls under the Lanham 
Act, it can be held liable in federal court for violations of 
that Act. See 15 U.S.C. S 1122. Moreover, Florida Prepaid 
continued its operations after the enactment of the TRCA. 
However, even though the first three requirements may be 
met, if the important government function exception applies 
to the present case, Florida Prepaid's activities would not 
waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
 
The district court determined that Florida Prepaid served 
a "role traditionally undertaken by state governments -- 
making available education opportunities," and thus the 
Parden doctrine could not be applied as a basis for a 
conclusion that Florida Prepaid's activities waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity. College Sav. Bank, 948 F. 
Supp. at 416. The district court recognized that Florida 
Prepaid does compete with private businesses, such as 
CSB, to provide prepaid tuition plans, but found that factor 
not to be dispositive. Instead, the district court focused on 
the benefits that Florida Prepaid provides to the education 
of Florida citizens. See id. at 417. Because Florida Prepaid 
directly furthers the goal of education by providing a 
system of financing for college and university education, the 
district court found that Florida Prepaid serves an 
important government function. We agree with the district 
court's determination and conclude that Florida Prepaid is 
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engaged in an important governmental function; therefore, 
the Parden doctrine of waiver does not apply to the present 
case. 
 
Education is a core function of a state government. See 
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493, 74 S.Ct. 686, 
691 (1954) ("Today, education is perhaps the most 
important function of state and local governments."). The 
Appellants do not dispute that education is an important 
government function. Instead, they seek to distinguish the 
goal of education from the function that Florida Prepaid 
performs. They argue that Florida Prepaid does not provide 
education directly; instead, it provides a means through 
which individuals can save for the costs of college tuition 
with an investment program. According to the Appellants, 
individuals traditionally have used a variety of investments 
to fulfill this purpose, and Florida Prepaid can be seen as 
merely an additional, competing means to meet the costs of 
college. 
 
We reject the Appellants' narrow conception of education 
as a core government function. Education encompasses 
more than classroom teaching; instead, the core function of 
education can include the provision of education-related 
services as well as direct classroom teaching. See, e.g., 
Skehan v. State Sys. of Higher Educ., 815 F.2d 244, 249 (3d 
Cir. 1987) (holding that the Pennsylvania State System of 
Higher Education is a state agency entitled to Eleventh 
Amendment immunity). Furthermore, in addition to states 
providing elementary and secondary schools for their 
citizens, they also long have provided facilities for college 
and graduate levels of education. In providing these higher 
levels of education, states routinely have charged 
discounted tuition fees to their own citizens. Yet even with 
such discounts, the cost of education can be prohibitive. 
The sole purpose of Florida Prepaid is to help individuals 
meet this expense of higher education. See Fla. Stat. ch. 
240.551(1) (1997). As the statute creating the Florida 
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Program states: 
 
       The Legislature recognizes that education opportunity 
       at the postsecondary level is a critical state interest. It 
       further recognizes that educational opportunity is best 
       ensured through the provision of postsecondary 
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       institutions that are geographically and financially 
       accessible. Accordingly, it is the intent of the 
       Legislature that a program be established through 
       which many of the costs associated with postsecondary 
       attendance may be paid in advance . . . . 
 
Id. 
 
Although private businesses such as CSB operate similar 
programs, Florida Prepaid nevertheless serves the goal of 
ensuring that higher education is affordable to all of its 
citizens. Merely because the state competes with private 
enterprises does not mean that it is not performing a core 
government function. For instance, even in the context of 
classroom education, private schools operate on a 
competitive basis with public schools on all levels: 
elementary, high school, and university. 
 
The Florida legislature specifically authorized and created 
Florida Prepaid to facilitate the education of its citizens. 
The core government function of education does not 
necessarily only embody the actual teaching of individuals; 
it is a broader function which can incorporate actions that 
involve related aspects to this overall goal.5 Florida Prepaid 
serves the important government interest of education by 
making it affordable to its citizens; therefore, the Parden 
doctrine does not apply to the present case and does not 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. In addressing a similar issue, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit has decided that an educational trust fund operated by the State 
of Michigan performs a public function. See Michigan v. United States, 
40 F.3d 817 (6th Cir. 1994). The Michigan Educational Trust is a state 
agency created to enter into advance tuition payment contracts with 
individuals to provide tuition prepayments for college education. See id. 
at 820-21. In determining whether the entity is subject to tax by the 
United States, the court of appeals concluded that: 
 
       [E]ncouraging higher education by helping provide the means for 
       attendance at Michigan's public colleges and universities--the 
basic 
       function for which the education trust was established by the 
       Michigan legislature--is at least as much a `public function' as 
       building and operating bridges and tunnels. 
 
Id. at 825. Based on this conclusion, the court held that the entity has 
tax-exempt status. See id. at 829. 
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supply a basis for a conclusion that Florida Prepaid has 
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity. 
 
As we have indicated, Florida Prepaid has argued and the 
district court has held that Seminole Tribe implicitly 
overruled Parden. See College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 
420. We, however, do not reach this difficult question 
because we have no need to do so. In our view, a court of 
appeals should be reluctant to hold that the Supreme Court 
implicitly has overruled its own decision when the Court 
had an opportunity to overrule the decision explicitly and 
did not do so. Thus, we view our methodology as in keeping 
with the respect which we must pay to the Supreme Court. 
 
2. Waiver of Immunity by Conduct in Litigation 
 
Finally, CSB contends that Florida Prepaid has waived its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity through its appearance in 
this litigation, by filing a counterclaim, and by failing 
initially to raise its Eleventh Amendment immunity defense. 
The district court rejected this argument and found that 
Florida Prepaid did not waive its immunity defense. See 
College Sav. Bank, 948 F. Supp. at 414. We will affirm the 
district court's determination of this matter and hold that 
Florida Prepaid raised its defense in a timely manner. 
 
A state can waive an Eleventh Amendment immunity 
defense through a voluntary appearance in litigation 
against it in federal court. See Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 
436, 447-48, 2 S.Ct. 878, 883 (1883). In determining 
whether there has been a waiver, courts have examined the 
extent to which a state has participated in the lawsuit and 
whether it has defended the case on its merits. See Fordyce 
v. Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 441 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that a 
state could waive immunity by a voluntary appearance and 
defense on the merits); Hankins v. Finnel, 964 F.2d 853, 
856 (8th Cir. 1992) (recognizing the possibility of waiver 
through an appearance and defense on the merits); 995 
Fifth Ave. Assoc., L.P. v. New York State Dep't of Taxation 
and Fin., 963 F.2d 503, 507-08 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding New 
York's immunity to be waived through its participation in 
the lawsuit); Paul N. Howard Co. v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct 
Sewer Auth., 744 F.2d 880, 886 (1st Cir. 1984) (finding a 
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waiver of immunity by a party's appearance and filing of a 
counterclaim and a third-party complaint); Vecchione v. 
Wohlgemuth, 558 F.2d 150, 158-59 (3d Cir. 1977) (holding 
a state to have waived immunity by not raising the issue 
until after the final judgment). 
 
Florida Prepaid's participation in this litigation did not 
waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity. Because the 
immunity issue "sufficiently partakes of the nature of a 
jurisdictional bar," Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. at 678, 94 
S.Ct. at 1363, it is an issue that may be raised at any time 
during the pendency of the case. See Florida Dep't Of State 
v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 683 n.18, 102 S.Ct. 
3304, 3314 n.18 (1982). Merely because a state appears 
and offers defenses on the merits of the case, it does not 
automatically waive Eleventh Amendment immunity. See 
id.; see also Ford Motor Co. v. Dep't of Treasury of State of 
Ind., 323 U.S. 459, 466-67, 65 S.Ct. 347, 351-52 (1945) 
(considering Eleventh Amendment immunity for thefirst 
time on appeal); Mascheroni v. Board of Regents of the Univ. 
of Cal., 28 F.3d 1554, 1560 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that 
a state does not waive immunity merely by its appearance 
in a suit). 
 
The critical reason behind Florida Prepaid's delay in 
asserting an Eleventh Amendment defense was the timing 
of the Supreme Court's decision in Seminole Tribe. At the 
beginning of the litigation, the abrogation rule of Union Gas 
precluded an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense by 
Florida Prepaid.6 However, with Seminole Tribe, the 
successful assertion by Florida Prepaid of an immunity 
defense became a reasonable possibility. Therefore, 
following that decision, Florida Prepaid asserted its 
Eleventh Amendment immunity.7 Given this change in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The constitutionality of the TRCA was not in question prior to 
Seminole Tribe, because the TRCA and the underlying Lanham Act had 
clear foundations in the Commerce Clause. Union Gas had permitted 
Congress to abrogate states' immunity to suit in federal court on 
Commerce Clause grounds. With Seminole Tribe, this basis was 
eliminated and the only foundation for abrogation by Congress is section 
five of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
 
7. The Supreme Court decided Seminole Tribe on March 27, 1996. 
Florida Prepaid first informed the district court of its intention to move 
for dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds on April 8, 1996. See 
Appellee's br. at 39 n.16. 
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law and the precedent for allowing participation in lawsuits 
without waiving the immunity, we determine that Florida 
Prepaid did not waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity 
through its participation in this litigation. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
We will affirm the district court's dismissal of CSB's 
Lanham Act claim by order entered December 16, 1996. 
Although congressional actions are entitled to much 
deference, Congress cannot usurp the powers of the states. 
The Supreme Court in Seminole Tribe placed clear 
limitations on Congress' power to abrogate a state's 
Eleventh Amendment immunity; the TRCA exceeds these 
restrictions as applied to the present case, and thus we 
conclude that it is unconstitutional. Furthermore, we will 
affirm the district court's determination that Florida 
Prepaid did not waive its immunity either under Parden or 
through its participation in this litigation. Therefore, 
because the Eleventh Amendment applies to bar this 
lawsuit against Florida Prepaid in federal court, we will 
affirm the district court's dismissal of CSB's Lanham Act 
suit in its entirety. 
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